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“[I]f the witness be of good fame, if she presently discovered the offense
and made pursuit after the offender, showed circumstances and signs of
the injury, . . . ; these and the like are concurring evidences to give greater
probability to her testimony, when proved by others as well as herself.”2
“Traditionally, the law has done more than reflect the restrictive and
sexist views of our society; it has legitimized and contributed to them. In
the same way, a law that rejected those views and respected female
autonomy might do more than reflect the changes in our society; it might
even push them forward a bit.”3
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of rape law, victims of sexual assault have been subjected
to many unique substantive and procedural obstacles adversely affecting the
successful prosecution of their attackers. Among these were the corroboration and
resistance requirements, which shared at their core an inherent distrust of female

2

1 MATTHEW HALE, HISOTRIA PLACITORUM CORNAE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 633 (2003) (originally published in 1736). For a contemporary example of a
corroboration requirement in action, see Meredith Bennett-Smith, Norfolk Police Rape Policy
Deemed Reports 'Unfounded,' But Outrage Forces Change, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 14, 2013.
3

Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1093-94 (1986).
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rape complainants.4 Under the former, no prosecution could proceed absent
corroborating evidence; the victim’s testimony alone would not suffice.5 The
corroboration requirement exhibited an explicit distrust of female6 rape victims
because no other common law crime had a similar requirement.7 Under the latter,
rape law required victims to demonstrate adequate resistance to the rape or forfeit
their right to protection from sexual predators. The resistance requirement was also
unique among common law offenses. It demonstrated a tacit distrust of female rape
victims because resistance helped to verify nonconsent.8 Evidence of physical
resistance—perhaps of bruises and other injuries—proved that the rape victim was
not lying. Almost three centuries ago, Matthew Hale succinctly summarized these
notions: “[S]igns of the injury, . . . and the like are concurring evidences to give
greater probability to her testimony, when proved by others as well as herself.”9
In response to alarming statistics about the dearth of rape cases brought to
successful fruition,10 feminist critiques of rape law,11 and changing attitudes about
sexual autonomy,12 rape and sexual assault statutes in America have undergone

4

Others included the prompt complaint and chastity requirements, the marital exemption,
and cautionary jury instructions. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 893, 922-31 (5th ed.
2010).
5

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1962).

6

Despite the gender neutrality of most modern rape statutes, the vast majority of rape
victims are women and the vast majority of perpetrators are men. According to Michael Planty
et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994-2010, March
2013, 9% of victims are male. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports for 2011 reported that of those
arrested for rape, 98.8% were male and 1.1% were female. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: TABLE 33 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.
gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-33.
7

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 926-27.

8

Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1977) (“[T]he singularity of the law of rape stems mainly from a deep
distrust of the female accuser.”); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM
VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO 38-41 (1987) [hereinafter ESTRICH, REAL RAPE] (discussing
how resistance requirement in rape law was thought necessary to combat a woman's likelihood
of lying).
9

HALE, supra note 2, at 635.

10

Anon., Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J.
1365, 1370 & n.38 (1972) (reporting study of New York City in 1969 where corroboration
requirement resulted in only 18 convictions out of 1,085 arrests) (citing Oelsner, supra note 1,
at § 4, at 5); Berger, supra note 8, at 5 (noting low charging and conviction rates for the crime
of rape).
11

See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975); CATHERINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 8; Stephen J. Schulhofer, The
Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995); Victoria Nourse,
Symposium on Unfinished Feminist Business: The “Normal” Success and Failures of
Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 951, 964 (2000) (“To write of
feminist reform in the criminal law is to write of simultaneous success and failure.”).
12
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enormous revision during the last few decades.13 The barriers to successful
prosecution of rape cases—including the corroboration and resistance
requirements—have been slowly eroding in modern statutory law. Despite rampant
rape reform, these old-fashioned requirements have been remarkably persistent, and
vestiges of them remain in twenty-first-century statutory enactments.14
The Ohio General Assembly has made considerable progress in modernizing the
state’s rape laws, eliminating many of the substantive and procedural obstacles to the
successful prosecution of criminals.15 Yet, Ohio’s contemporary sexual offense
provisions include vestiges of both the corroboration and resistance requirements.
More specifically, the corroboration requirement (1) still applies to the crime of
sexual imposition and (2) is used as a grading factor in gross sexual imposition.16
The resistance requirement (1) has been eliminated from rape and gross sexual
imposition, but not sexual battery and sexual imposition, and (2) the wording of the
existing resistance-elimination provisions is legally inaccurate.17 Finally, (3)
resistance language (i.e., “ability to resist”) appears in subsections of the rape, gross
sexual imposition, and sexual battery statutes, causing confusion about whether
physical resistance is required by victims of these offenses.18
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the four most important sexual
offense statutes in Ohio—rape, sexual battery, gross sexual imposition, and sexual
imposition—to provide the necessary backdrop for the subsequent analysis.19 Part III
examines the vestiges of the corroboration requirement in Ohio’s sexual imposition
and gross sexual imposition statutes and analyzes an Ohio Supreme Court opinion
directly on point. This Part argues that the remnants of the corroboration requirement
should be eliminated as an outmoded expression of victim unreliability in rape law
Amid the flux of scholarly debate and practical reform, one thing is clear. The law of
rape has not ceased and in all likelihood will not cease to evolve. Nor, arguably,
should it, for the law of rape, like any body of law—perhaps more than other bodies of
law—reflects changing social attitudes and conditions, normative as well as material.
KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 43, 82 (1996) (footnote
omitted).
13

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 893-95.

14

See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social
Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 644 (2010) [hereinafter
Anderson, Diminishing] (“The next generation of rape law reform [will be] to abolish the
remnants of the requirements for prompt complaint, corroboration, and cautionary
instructions.”); Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Marital Rape Allowance,
72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 264 (1993) (“Despite the willingness of many states to abolish the
marital exemption and the rejection of a marital rape allowance by some others, the issue of
marital rape offers stark proof that women still have far to go to achieve full equality.”).
15
For instance, Ohio was one of the first states to “have passed a statute completely
relieving the prosecution of the need to show resistance as proof of non-consent.” Berger,
supra note 8, at 11, 11 n.79.
16

See infra notes 44-91 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.

19

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01-.06 (West 2006).
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and offers simple statutory reforms to finally rid Ohio’s sexual offenses of any
corroboration requirement. Part IV analyzes three problem areas involving the
resistance requirement’s persistence in Ohio’s sexual offenses, and proposes
statutory modernization reworking the resistance-lifting language, incorporating
such language into the sexual battery and sexual imposition statutes, and revamping
incapacity provisions to focus on consent, not resistance. The Article concludes by
arguing that Ohio’s rape and sexual assault statutes could be substantially
modernized without massive legislative reworking. The proposed changes are
relatively modest in scope and would be quite easy to enact. The symbolic and realworld consequences of doing so are substantial.20
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OHIO’S SEXUAL OFFENSE PROVISIONS
Ohio’s “Sex Offenses” chapter begins with a definitional section21 followed by
five major offense categories, four of which are relevant to the present analysis:22
rape,23 sexual battery,24 gross sexual imposition,25 and sexual imposition.26 Two
offenses, rape and sexual battery, prohibit sexual conduct (vaginal and anal
intercourse, oral sex, and penetration)27 under specified conditions, e.g., when force

20

Vivian Berger asserts:

Rape is probably one of the most under-reported crimes. Reluctance to report serious
offenses poses a problem for the criminal justice system in general. Fifty to eighty
percent of such crimes may never enter statistical rolls because victims, for reasons
ranging from fear of reprisal to belief that nothing will ever be done, fail to make
official complaints. Estimates of the actual incidence of rape, however, range from
three and one half to twenty times the reported figure! The system's perceived hostility
to the rape complainant, coupled with the singular shame and trauma of sexual assault,
may well explain this troubling phenomenon.
Berger, supra note 8, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
21

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (West 2006).

22

Ohio also has a statute criminalizing unlawful sexual conduct with minors that prohibits
essentially statutory rape—sexual conduct with a person below the age of legal consent. Id.
§ 2907.04.
23

Id. § 2907.02.

24

Id. § 2907.03.

25

Id. § 2907.05.

26

Id. § 2907.06. Ohio’s sex offense chapter also outlaws other types of conduct, such as
importuning and prostitution, see id. §§ 2907.07 and 2907.25 respectively, but these are
outside the purview of the present analysis.
27

“Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal
intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without
privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any
instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another.
Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
Id. § 2907.01(A).
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or threat of force is used under rape28 and when the victim is unaware that the act is
being committed under sexual battery.29 In terms of offense grading, rape is a felony
in the first degree with different levels of punishment depending on the
circumstances;30 sexual battery is a felony in the third degree.31 The other two
offenses, gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition, outlaw sexual contact
(defined as the touching of another’s erogenous zones)32 under different sets of
circumstances, e.g., whether the offender used force or administered drugs to the
victim. Gross sexual imposition is a felony of the third or fourth degree.33 Sexual
imposition may be a misdemeanor of the first or third degree depending upon the
defendant’s previous sexual offense convictions.34
A considerable degree of parallelism exists between the rape and gross sexual
imposition statutes, despite prohibiting different types of sexual activity—sexual
conduct and sexual contact—respectively. Although not completely co-extensive,35
both statutes prohibit sexual conduct or contact accomplished by force,36 by
surreptitious, forcible, or deceptive drugging,37 with a child under thirteen years
old,38 and with a substantially incapacitated person.39 A lesser degree of parallelism
exists between the sexual battery and sexual imposition statutes. Both outlaw sexual
conduct or sexual contact, respectively, when the victim is substantially impaired,40
unaware that a sexual act is being committed,41 or when the offender is a mental
health professional.42 The sexual battery and sexual imposition statutes also contain a
number of unique provisions not relevant for present purposes.

28

Id. § 2907.02(A)(2).

29

Id. § 2907.03(A)(3).

30

Id. § 2907.03(B).

31

Id. § 2907.02(B).

32

“‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including
without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a
breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” Id. § 2907.01(B).
33

Id. § 2907.05(B).

34

Id. § 2907.06(C).

35

See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. The gross sexual imposition statute also
has a provision about touching another person’s genitalia that is not present in the rape statute.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(B) (West 2006).
36

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(2), 2907.05(A)(1) (West 2006).

37

Id. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), 2907.05(A)(2).

38

Id. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(b), 2907.05(A)(4).

39

Id. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(c), 2907.05(A)(5).

40

Id. §§ 2907.03(A)(2), 2907.06(A)(2).

41

Id. §§ 2907.03(A)(3), 2907.06(A)(3).

42

Id. §§ 2907.03(A)(10), 2907.06(A)(5).
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III. VESTIGES OF CORROBORATION: OHIO’S SEXUAL IMPOSITION AND GROSS SEXUAL
IMPOSITION STATUTES
Under traditional rape law, the corroboration requirement was a method of
verifying a rape or sexual assault had taken place by insisting that evidence other
than the victim’s statement needed to be introduced at trial. As one author explained:
“Where corroboration was required, the prosecutor was forced to produce evidence
other than the word of the rape victim to corroborate the victim’s testimony,
establishing some or all of the essential elements of the case—identity of the
accused, penetration, and nonconsent.”43 Some legal commentators have noted the
underlying rationale for the corroboration requirement was an intrinsic distrust of
women and a “fear” of false accusations of rape.44
The Model Penal Code’s provision on corroboration is typical:
No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Article upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Corroboration may be
circumstantial. In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this
Article, the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim
or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional
involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.45
Today, the corroboration requirement has virtually disappeared from the modern
rape law. According to George Fisher, “No American jurisdiction retains a general
corroboration requirement in rape cases. Georgia abolished the last remaining
statutory rule in 1978 . . . and, Nebraska the last remaining common law rule in
1989.”46 As recently as 2004, Michelle Anderson reported that Ohio is one of only
three jurisdictions retaining the corroboration requirement in any of its sexual
offense provisions.47 Deborah Denno noted that even the drafters of the Model Penal
43

Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape
Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 125 (1999).
44
Id. Matthew Hale’s cynical view of rape is amply illustrated in his negative statement
that became a jury instruction. See infra note 133.
45

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1962). ”Sometimes, what is called for is not so much
independent evidence of particular elements of the offense, but rather merely a basis for
believing that the testimony of the complaining witness is worthy of credit and belief.” Id. §
213.1(a), commentary at 430.
46

George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 702 n.594 (1997)
(“Several states still require corroboration in specific cases. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262
(West 1997) (requiring corroboration in cases of spousal rape if the victim made no complaint
to an official or counselor within one year); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (1996) (requiring
corroboration in statutory rape prosecutions); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69 (1996) (same); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1987) (requiring corroboration when alleged lack of consent
is due to mental defect or incapacity); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.07 (West 1995)
(requiring corroboration when the victim made no complaint within one year of the assault,
unless the victim was less than 18 years old).”).
47
Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 945, 949-50 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson, The Legacy].
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Code “acknowledged the controversy surrounding the rule in the 1970s and stressed
that attitudes toward the doctrine were increasingly in a state of flux.”48 Many legal
scholars have credited feminist critiques of the corroboration requirement as being
largely responsible for its demise. These critics emphasized that no other crime
required the victim to meet special credibility standards, 49 that the corroboration
requirement operated as a barrier to the successful prosecution of sexual offenses,50
and, finally, that no empirical evidence existed to support the notion that women
make a large number of false rape accusations (i.e., that “ladies lie”).51

48

Denno, supra note 1, at 214.

49
Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 2171 (“At one time, the law of rape openly denied equality
to women, for example, in rules that required special corroboration for rape complaints.”).
50

According to Spohn:

Critics of the corroboration requirement claimed it was unnecessary and sexually
discriminatory. They argued that the rule was unnecessary since judges and juries
were “if anything, prejudiced against the complainant in a rape case.” Critics claimed
that it was difficult to obtain corroborating evidence concerning an act that typically
takes place in private without witnesses.
Spohn, supra note 43, at 125-26. Brownmiller concurs:
Since four out of five rapes go unreported, it is fair to say categorically that women do
not find rape “an accusation easily to be made.” Those who do report their rape soon
find, however, that it is indeed “hard to be proved.” . . . [The issue in rape cases] is
based on the cherished male assumption that female persons tend to lie.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 11, at 369.
51
Unfortunately, methodologically sound empirical data on the incidence of false
allegations of rape are not readily available. In his article reviewing the existing studies, Philip
N.S. Rumney summarizes the two major conclusions from empirical research on false rape
accusations:

First, many of the studies of false allegations have adopted unreliable or untested
research methodologies and, so we cannot discern with any degree of certainty the
actual rate of false allegations. A key component in judging the reliability of research
in this area relates to the criteria used to judge an allegation to be false. Some studies
use entirely unreliable criteria, while others provide only limited information on how
rates are measured. The second conclusion . . . is that the police continue to misapply
the no-crime or unfounding criteria and in so doing it would appear that some officers
have fixed views and expectations about how genuine rape victims should react to
their victimisation. The qualitative research also suggests that some officers continue
to exhibit an unjustified scepticism of rape complainants, while others interpret such
things as lack of evidence or complaint withdrawal as ‘‘proof’’ of a false allegation.
. . . However, the exact extent to which police officers incorrectly label allegations as
false is difficult to discern.
Philip N.S. Rumney, False Allegations of Rape, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 128, 142 (2006)
(footnote omitted); see also David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An
Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318 (2010)
(identifying only eight empirical studies using sound definitions and methodologies, with rates
of false allegations ranging from 2.1% to 10.9%).
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A. Corroboration as a Bar to Prosecution under the Sexual Imposition Statute
With two notable exceptions, Ohio has followed the national trend in American
jurisdictions to eliminate the corroboration requirement in its sexual offenses.52 The
first exception is the sexual imposition statute, which punishes various forms of
sexual contact, including when the victim’s ability to appraise her conduct is
substantially impaired or the victim is unaware of the sexual contact. The statute
contains a corroboration requirement: “No person shall be convicted of a violation of
this section solely upon the victim’s testimony unsupported by other evidence.”53
Thus, one of Ohio’s primary sexual offenses still requires corroboration before a
prosecution may be brought.
Unlike other outmoded aspects of Ohio’s sexual offenses, the sexual imposition
statute’s corroboration requirement has been the subject of relatively recent judicial
treatment. In the 1996 case of State v. Economo,54 the Supreme Court of Ohio was
required to parse the meaning of the corroboration requirement and to consider its
continued viability. The defendant was a doctor convicted of two counts of sexual
imposition on a young woman patient.55 The central witness in the prosecution’s case
was the victim, who testified to the instances of sexual imposition—“specifically she
claimed he massaged her breast and vaginal areas and, through his pants, he brushed
his erect penis against her arm.”56 The only other witness was the victim’s sister,
who testified that she had accompanied the victim to the doctor’s office because the
victim was upset about the doctor touching her.57 The sister was not present in the
examination room where the sexual contact occurred, but she did observe her sister
leave the exam room on the verge of tears.58 Thus, the only corroboration was the
victim’s statements to her sister and the sister’s observation of the victim leaving the
examination room.
At trial, the defendant claimed the case should have been dismissed because the
state had failed to produce corroborating evidence as required by the sexual
imposition statute.59 The trial court overruled defendant’s objection, and the jury
52
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520h (2010) (“The testimony of a victim need not
be corroborated.”); MINN. STAT. § 609.341 Subd. 4(c) (2010) (“Corroboration of the victim’s
testimony is not required to show lack of consent.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2028 (2010) (“The
testimony of a person who is a victim of a sexual assault as defined in sections 28-319 to 28320.01 shall not require corroboration.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 (2010) (“The testimony
of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under Sections 2 through 5 of this act and
such testimony shall be entitled to the same weight as the testimony of victims of other crimes
under the Criminal Code.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-657 (2009) (“The testimony of the victim
need not be corroborated in prosecutions under §§ 16-3-652 through 16-3-658.”); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-311 (2010) (“Corroboration of a victim’s testimony is not necessary to obtain a
conviction for sexual assault.”).
53

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(B) (West 2006).

54

State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).

55

Id. at 226.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 227.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

9

352

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:343

convicted him.60 The appellate court reversed the conviction.61 The Ohio Supreme
Court reinstated the conviction, holding that sufficient corroboration existed to allow
the case to go to the jury;62 it was then up to the jury to determine whether the
government had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority of the
Court declined to abolish the corroboration requirement in the sexual imposition
statute, feeling bound by the language enacted by the Ohio legislature.63 “We
therefore reject this proposition of law and do not strike down the corroboration
requirement, even though we agree that it represents waning attitudes toward victims
of sexual offenses.”64 The Court held that the corroboration requirement did not
mandate the introduction of evidence sufficient to convict the defendant (i.e., meet
the burden of persuasion), but only enough evidence to support the victim’s
testimony, and the Court found that sufficient evidence existed in Economo.65
In her concurring opinion, Justice Alice Robie Resnick argued that a
corroboration requirement is unnecessary in the context of the crime of sexual
imposition.66 She quoted at length from the dissenting opinion of Judge Donald
Nugent in the Ohio Court of Appeals, who also suggested that corroboration was
unnecessary:
Moreover, elimination of the corroboration requirement hardly leaves
defendants unprotected against unjust convictions. The defendant is
entitled to all of the established safeguards of our criminal justice system,
e.g., the presumption of innocence, the right not to incriminate oneself,
the right to the effective assistance of counsel, etc. In addition, it is the
trial judge’s responsibility to charge the jury as to the government’s
burden of proving all essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, protection against unjust convictions on a caseby-case basis is afforded defendants by the general rule that judgments of
acquittal or reversals of conviction must be granted where sufficient
evidence does not exist to support a guilty verdict, whether or not
independent corroboration is technically present. . . . Given those
safeguards, which are adequate in virtually every other type of
prosecution, . . . , I have no reluctance in advocating the abolishment of
the corroboration requirement of R.C. 2907.06 and leaving to the trial
court, whose paramount obligation is always to see that justice is done,
the initial responsibility of ensuring that a conviction for sexual
imposition is based on sufficient evidence.67
60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 229.

63

Id.

64

Id. (emphasis added).

65

Id.

66

Id. at 230-31 (Resnick, J., concurring).

67

Id. at 231 (quoting State v. Economo, No. 66408, 1994 WL 693485, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 8, 1994) (Nugent, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Resnick urged the Ohio General Assembly to eliminate the corroboration
requirement.68
In his dissent in Economo, Justice Mark Painter criticized the majority for
essentially eliminating the corroboration requirement by watering it down to such a
great extent that “it is difficult to imagine a case where the legislature’s enactment
would be viable.”69 He reasoned that because the corroboration requirement was still
in effect in the sexual imposition statute, the statute should be strictly interpreted in
the defendant’s favor—an invocation of the rule of lenity.70 According to Justice
Painter, the Ohio Supreme Court should have dismissed the case against Economo
because the corroboration requirement had not been satisfied. 71 He wrote: “Because
the majority decision changes the statutory law by judicial fiat, I respectfully
dissent.”72
1. Critique of the Sexual Imposition Statute
The corroboration requirement in Ohio’s sexual imposition statute appears to be
a last vestige from a time in American rape jurisprudence that corroboration was an
important hallmark of rape law and suspicion of rape victims was rampant. Matthew
Hale’s cynical view of rape affected American rape law for centuries.73 The rape
reform movements of the 1950s and 1970s did much to dismantle the substantive
and procedural obstacles to the prosecution of rape cases. In particular, the resistance
and corroboration requirements were substantially altered during these reform
phases.74 Like an organ that is no longer required for the proper functioning of the
human body, the corroboration requirement in Ohio’s sexual imposition statute has
outlived its usefulness and may pose a barrier to the successful prosecution of
68

To date, the Ohio General Assembly has not responded to Justice Resnick’s suggestion.

69

Economo, 666 N.E.2d at 232 (Painter, J., dissenting) (“We must follow the law as
written by the legislature, whether we like it or not. The majority decision in effect removes
this section from the books.”).
70

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812
(1971); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.04(A) (West 2006) (“Except as otherwise
provided in division (C) or (D) of this section, sections of the Revised Code defining offenses
or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the
accused.”).
71
For several other cases interpreting the corroboration requirement of the sexual
imposition statute, see: State v. Menke, No. CA2002-01-021, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 83
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2003); State v. Paluga, No. CA2002-02-041, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
6673 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2002); City of Akron v. Myers, No. 20743, 2002 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1049 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2002).
72

Economo, 666 N.E.2d at 232 (Painter, J., dissenting). As Joshua Dressler notes, the rule
of lenity “support[s] the principle of legality by preventing a court from inadvertently
enlarging the scope of a criminal statute through its interpretive powers.” JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 48 (6th ed. 2012). Justice Painter’s argument is important in
preserving the balance between legislative and judicial authority.
73

HALE, supra note 2, at 633-35.

74

See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual
Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 799 (1988).
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offenders. Without the Ohio Supreme Court’s very liberal interpretation of
corroboration, the case in Economo would have been dismissed.
The Ohio legislature’s failure to eliminate the corroboration requirement in the
sexual imposition provision goes against the vast majority of American jurisdictions
that have eliminated the corroboration requirement. Ohio is one of only three states
that still retains the corroboration requirement in any form in its sexual offense
provisions. No data exists to suggest that victims of sexual imposition are more
likely than victims of other crimes to be unreliable or prone to fabricate charges
against innocent persons.75
2. Suggested Statutory Reform
Following the suggestion of some members of the Ohio Supreme Court, the
General Assembly should abolish the corroboration requirement in the sexual
imposition statute. This reform would be extremely easy. The legislature could
delete the language in the sexual imposition statute requiring corroboration (i.e., “No
person shall be convicted of a violation of this section solely upon the victim’s
testimony unsupported by other evidence.”76) Deletion of this requirement would
equalize the proof needed for all Ohio sexual offenses. It would allow Ohio to join
the other American jurisdictions that have eliminated all vestiges of this requirement.
Finally, it would complete a reform that began years earlier to rid the Ohio sexual
offenses of explicit distrust of rape victims and clearly communicate to victims of
sexual offenses that they are worthy of belief.
Alternatively, the legislature could explicitly eliminate the corroboration
requirement in all sexual offenses. For instance, the legislature in Nebraska enacted
this provision: “The testimony of a person who is a victim of a sexual assault as
defined in §§ 28-319 to 28-320.01 shall not require corroboration.”77 An even
stronger lifting of the corroboration requirement may be found in Pennsylvania:
The credibility of a complainant of an offense under this chapter shall be
determined by the same standard as is the credibility of a complainant of
any other crime. The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated
in prosecutions under this chapter. No instructions shall be given
cautioning the jury to view the complainant’s testimony in any other way
than that in which all complainants’ testimony is viewed.78
Thus, Ohio legislators could follow Pennsylvania’s lead by enacting a provision
that eliminates corroboration and also equates the credibility of victims of sexual
offenses with the credibility of other crime victims.

75

See supra note 52.

76

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(B) (West 2006).

77

NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2028 (2010) (entitled “Sexual assault; testimony; corroboration
not required”).
78
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3106 (2010); see also MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2009) (“In a
prosecution under sections 609.342 to 609.3451; 609.3453; or Minnesota Statutes 2004,
section 609.109, the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.”).
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B. Corroboration as a Grading Criterion in the Gross Sexual Imposition Statute
The corroboration requirement also appears in Ohio’s gross sexual imposition
statute, which punishes sexual contact in more serious circumstances than the sexual
imposition statute (e.g., when the touching occurs by force or after the defendant
drugs the victim.) The gross sexual imposition statute contains a grading provision
pertaining to when the victim of the sexual contact is less than thirteen years old or
when the victim is under twelve.79 The grading provision requires the court to
impose a mandatory prison term equal to a term prescribed for a felony in the third
degree80 under Ohio Revised Code § 2929.14 if either of the following circumstances
applies:
(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in the
case corroborating the violation;
(b) The offender previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
violation of this section, rape, the former offense of felonious sexual
penetration, or sexual battery, and the victim of the previous offense was
less than thirteen years of age.81
Thus, gross sexual imposition will be graded as a more serious felony, with a
longer period of incarceration, if corroboration is present or the defendant had a
previous conviction for a sexual offense against a victim less than thirteen years old.
1. Critique of the Gross Sexual Imposition Statute
At first glance, use of corroboration as a grading determinant in Ohio’s gross
sexual imposition statute to elevate a fourth-degree felony to a third-degree felony
seems slightly less objectionable because at least the prosecution is not barred by the
absence of corroboration. The prosecution may still proceed against the alleged
sexual offender without other evidence. However, upon closer scrutiny, it is not at all
clear that a case in which corroboration exists should be punished more severely than
a case with no corroboration. In all cases resulting in conviction, those with
corroboration and those without, the jury must find the defendant guilty by the same
burden of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt. If a jury is convinced by that quantum
of proof, then it should be legally irrelevant whether corroboration exists, just as it
would be legally irrelevant whether the case involved fingerprint, DNA, or other
forms of evidence. As the Ohio Supreme Court commented in Economo about the
corroboration requirement in the sexual imposition statute, “The corroboration
79

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 2006).

80

Other sections of the gross sexual imposition statute are determined to be felonies of the
fourth degree. Id. § 2907.05(C)(1).
81

Id. § 2907.05(C)(2) (emphasis added) (“(2) Gross sexual imposition committed in
violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree. Except as
otherwise provided in this division, for gross sexual imposition committed in violation of
division (A)(4) or (B) of this section there is a presumption that a prison term shall be imposed
for the offense. The court shall impose on an offender convicted of gross sexual imposition in
violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section a mandatory prison term equal to one of the
prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the third degree
if either of the following applies: . . . ”).
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requirement . . . is a threshold inquiry of legal sufficiency to be determined by the
trial court and is not a question of proof for the factfinder.”82 Yet, its use as a grading
criterion in the gross sexual imposition statute seems to contradict this holding,
imposing a more severe penalty on those whose conduct is corroborated.
Moreover, the existence of corroboration does not bear on the question of moral
blameworthiness, the predominant consideration in grading or sentencing
decisions.83 Consider the second grading criterion in the gross sexual imposition
statute: whether the defendant was previously convicted of a sexual offense against a
very young victim.84 Many modern sentencing schemes, including the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, consider the offender’s criminal history in meting out the
appropriate punishment.85 Under the individual deterrence rationale for criminal
punishment, a recidivist offender should receive a greater punishment to discourage
him from reoffending.86 But in the corroboration situation, the criminal actor’s
conduct (and prior criminal history) is exactly the same whether corroboration exists
or not. To put it another way, why is the defendant more morally blameworthy when
corroboration exists? The obvious explanation for corroboration as a grading factor
is a tacit re-emergence of the notion that rape victims are not to be trusted, and we
truly believe them only when corroboration exists. When corroboration exists, so the
argument might go, we can be confident enough that gross sexual imposition
occurred and that a harsher penalty should be imposed. In this way, the grading
provision is as problematic as the elemental corroboration requirement in the sexual
imposition statute.
2. Suggested Statutory Reform
Ohio legislators should eliminate the grading subsection concerning
corroboration in the gross sexual imposition statute by deleting this language:
“Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in the case
corroborating the violation; . . . .”87 The underlying rationale that a defendant is more
worthy of punishment or is more deserving of a lengthier term of incarceration
because of the existence of corroboration should be rejected. The defendant’s moral
blameworthiness needs to be disaggregated from questions about the victim’s
trustworthiness. No change needs to be made concerning the section regarding the
offender’s criminal history—an appropriate grading consideration. By deleting the
corroboration grading determinant, Ohio legislators can fully extinguish the tacit
82

State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996).

83

Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1, 10 (1980) (“It is deeply rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment entails blame,
and that therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the person is not
blameworthy.”).
84

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(C)(2) (West 2006).

85

KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS
(5th ed. 2011).
86
DRESSLER, supra note 72, at 15 (discussing individual deterrence as a goal of
punishment); see also LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 29-30 (discussing deterrence as a goal of
criminal punishment).
87

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(C)(2)(a) (West 2006).
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assumption that cases involving corroboration are worthy of greater punishment
because the victim is more credible. The circumstance of whether the victim was
corroborated is simply irrelevant to the defendant’s moral culpability.
IV. VESTIGES OF RESISTANCE: OHIO’S RAPE, SEXUAL BATTERY, GROSS SEXUAL
IMPOSITION, AND SEXUAL IMPOSITION STATUTES
Under early versions of rape law, the victim of a sexual assault was required to
resist her assailant to the utmost, an exceptionally difficult standard to meet.88
Usually, this required use of her full physical powers to defeat her attacker89 and
physical resistance continuing without interruption.90 Over time, most American
jurisdictions softened the requirement so that resistance to the utmost was no longer
required, but retained the requirement that the rape victim demonstrate some amount
of resistance.91 Feminist critiques of rape law further eroded the importance of the
resistance requirement by arguing that sometimes resistance by the victim would
result in greater injury or possibly death.92 As Vivian Berger observed: “With respect
to resistance, male lawmakers realize at last what every woman always knew:
Fighting back is extremely risky—‘purity’ may exact too high a price.”93
88

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 914-15; Spohn, supra note 43, at 119-20.

89

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 914-15; HALE, supra note 2, at 633. Hale writes:

The party ravished may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a competent witness,
but the credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she is to be believed, must be
left to the jury, and is more or less credible according to the circumstances of fact, that
concur in that testimony.
For instance, if the witness be of good fame, if she presently discovered the offense
and made pursuit after the offender, showed circumstances and signs of the injury,
whereof many are of that nature, that only women are the most proper examiners and
inspectors, if the place, wherein the fact was done, was remote from people,
inhabitants or passengers, if the offender fled for it; these and the like are concurring
evidences to give greater probability to her testimony, when proved by others as well
as herself.
But on the other side, if she concealed the injury for any considerable time after she
had opportunity to complain, if the place, where the fact was supposed to be
committed, were near to inhabitants or common recourse or passage of passengers,
and she made no outcry when the fact was supposed to be done, when and where it is
probable she might be heard by others; these and the like circumstances carry a strong
presumption, that her testimony is false or feigned.
Id.
90

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 914-15.

91

Id.

92

See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992); Spohn, supra note 43; MODEL
PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES § 305-06 (“First, resistance may prove an invitation to danger of
death or serious bodily harm. Second, it is wrong to excuse the male assailant on the ground
that his victim failed to protect herself with a dedication and intensity that a court might
expect of a reasonable person in her situation.”).
93

Berger, supra note 8, at 11.
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A vast majority of states have eliminated resistance language from their rape
statutes.94 Some jurisdictions have also explicitly stated that resistance is not
required.95 For instance, Illinois’s statute provides:
It shall be a defense to any offense . . . where force or threat of force is an
element of the offense that the victim consented. “Consent” means a
freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct
in question. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the
victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused
shall not constitute consent.96
Commentators have debated whether the explicit elimination of the resistance
requirement has merely pushed the question of resistance underground such that
juries still consider evidence of resistance in determining whether the offender is
guilty of rape.97 Contemporary discussions of the resistance requirement usually
center on the issue of whether verbal resistance is sufficient.98 Ohio’s treatment of
the resistance requirement in its sexual offense provisions raises several problems.
A. The Language of the Provisions Eliminating Resistance in the Rape and Gross
Sexual Imposition Statutes
Following the trend among American jurisdictions to abolish the resistance
requirement, two of Ohio’s four sexual offense provisions—rape and gross sexual
imposition—explicitly eliminate the need for physical resistance by the victim.99 In
94
LaFave reports that thirty states have no resistance language in their rape statutes and
that six states explicitly provide that physical resistance is no longer required, although he
cautions that resistance may still play a tacit role in some jurisdictions. See LAFAVE, supra
note 4, at 915; Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV.
953 [hereinafter Anderson, Reviving Resistance]; Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force:
The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19, 20 (1996) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
COMMENTARIES pt. II (1980)).
95

Anderson, Reviving Resistance, supra note 94, at 966-67.

96

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-17 (West 2011); Berger, supra note 8, at 12 (“The
overall purpose of these reforms is to treat rape more like other offenses. A major motif is that
rape prosecutions should concentrate on the defendant's conduct, inquiring into the actions of
the complaining witness only when fairness so requires.”).
97

DRESSLER, supra note 72, at 581 (“But, even as courts and legislatures abolish or soften
the resistance rule, a female’s resistance—or lack thereof—has not lost its potential relevance
in rape prosecutions. That is, although substantial resistance may no longer be necessary to
prove rape (and in a few jurisdictions, none is required), proof of resistance may be helpful—
or even critical—to the fact finder’s determination that a rape has occurred.”); MODEL PENAL
CODE COMMENTARIES § 305-06 (“As a practical matter, juries may require resistance to show
that the male compelled her to submit, but there is little reason to encase this generalization in
a rule of law. Where the proof establishes that the actor did compel submission to intercourse
by force, the failure of a weak or fearful victim to display ‘utmost’ or even ‘earnest’ resistance
should not be exculpatory.”).
98

LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 915-16.

99

The status of the resistance requirement in Ohio’s sexual offenses is complex and multifaceted, much like its treatment of the marital exemption. See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, The Three
Marital Exemptions in Ohio’s Rape Statute, 88 LAW & FACT 24 (2007).
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fact, Ohio was one of the first states to eliminate the resistance requirement.100 The
rape statute, prohibiting sexual conduct (i.e., sexual intercourse, oral sex, and
penetration) under a set of enumerated circumstances, provides: “A victim need not
prove physical resistance to the offender in prosecutions under this section.”101 The
gross sexual imposition statute, covering instances of sexual contact (i.e., touching
of the erogenous zones) under a similar set of circumstances, uses the identical
language to eliminate resistance.102
1. Critique of the Statutory Language
The explicit elimination of physical resistance from the rape and gross sexual
imposition statutes is salutary because these abolish a potential impediment to rape
prosecutions. The language of the resistance-elimination provisions, however, is
legally inaccurate and may be confusing. The provision begins with the phrase “A
victim need not prove . . . .”103 However, rape victims are not parties to criminal
prosecutions, and concomitantly they bear no evidentiary burden in court.104 Rather,
the government is required to prove that the defendant committed the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.105 In making such proof, the government is not required to prove
that the victim physically resisted.106 As one Ohio appellate court accurately
interpreted the rape statute: “Pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(C), the State is not required to
prove resistance by the victim in a rape case.”107
The wording of the resistance-elimination provisions is not a matter of mere
semantics. The current formulation of these provisions unfortunately evokes the time
when victims were essentially put on trial108 rather than the defendant. This language
continues to inaccurately communicate that the victim is required, or not required, to
prove something in a rape case perpetuates the focus on the victim rather than on the
alleged offender.109 If courts base model jury instructions on this statutory language,
100

Berger, supra note 8, at 11, 11 n.79.

101

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) (West 2006).

102

Id. § 2907.05(D).

103

Id. § 2907.02(C).

104

In articulating the difference between the criminal and civil systems, LaFave comments:
“With crimes, the state itself brings criminal proceedings to protect the public interest but not
to compensate the victim; with torts, the injured party himself institutes proceedings to
recover damages (or perhaps to enjoin the defendant from causing further damage).” LAFAVE,
supra note 4, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
105

Id. at 58, 71-72.

106

State v. Varner, No. 98CA00016, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4707 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
14, 1998).
107

Id.

108

As the court in M.T.S. wrote in discussing the resistance requirement: “That the law put
the rape victim on trial was clear.” In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992); see also
The Legal Bias Against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975) (“Distrust of the complainant’s
credibility [had] led to an exaggerated insistence on evidence of resistance.”).
109

Drafters of the Model Penal Code were also worried that too much emphasis was placed
on the victim in a rape case and not enough on the offender. The MPC Commentary explains:
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juries may be confused as to how to assess the evidence in a rape or gross sexual
imposition case.
2. Suggested Statutory Reform
The language in Ohio’s rape and gross sexual imposition statutes regarding the
elimination of the resistance requirement should be slightly modified to more clearly
indicate that victims bear no burden of proof in criminal prosecutions. Instead of
reading “A victim need not prove physical resistance . . . ,”110 the language should
state: “The government need not prove that the victim physically resisted the
offender in prosecutions under this section.” Or, as one court put it, “the State is not
required to prove resistance by the victim in a rape case.”111 These alternate
formulations clearly and unequivocally communicate that the physical resistance
requirement is not placed on either the victim or the prosecution in a rape case.
Moreover, they ensure that no confusion exists regarding the identity of the parties to
the criminal case. Finally, they help to focus attention on the conduct of the criminal
actor rather than on the victim.
B. The Continued Viability of the Resistance Requirement, or the Absence of
Language Eliminating Resistance, in the Sexual Battery and Sexual Imposition
Statutes
A very tangible vestige of the resistance requirement exists in Ohio sexual
offenses because only the rape and gross sexual imposition statutes contain language
eliminating the physical resistance requirement. Neither of the other two major
offenses—sexual battery or sexual imposition—contain the provision eliminating the
need for physical resistance by the victim.
1. Critique of the Absence of Language Eliminating the Physical Resistance
Requirement in Sexual Battery and Sexual Imposition
The absence of the resistance-lifting language from the sexual battery and sexual
imposition statutes raises serious concerns. Does this mean that the state must prove
that the victims of these offenses physically resisted their attackers? If the victims do
not physically resist their attackers, will the cases against those criminal actors be

By focusing upon the actor who “compels” the victim “to submit by force” and by
omitting express language of consent and resistance, the Model Penal Code casts
away encrusted precedent and strikes a fresh approach. This is not to say that consent
by the victim is irrelevant or that inquiry into the level of resistance by the victim
cannot or should not be made. Compulsion plainly implies non-consent, just as
resistance is evidence of non-consent. By the same token, the lack of resistance on a
particular occasion will not preclude a conviction of rape if the jury can be convinced
by the context and the degree of force employed by the actor that the submission was
by compulsion.
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to § 213.1, at 30607 (1980).
110

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(D) (West 2006).

111

State v. Varner, No. 98CA00016, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4707 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
14, 1998).
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jeopardized? Under the basic rules of statutory construction,112 a criminal defendant
might argue that physical resistance is still required by the victim in sexual battery
and sexual imposition cases because two of Ohio’s other sexual offenses explicitly
eliminate the need for physical resistance by the victim. The Ohio legislature must
have intended to retain the resistance requirement in the sexual battery and sexual
imposition offenses, a defendant might argue, because it demonstrated the ability to
eliminate the requirement in the other provisions.113 In other words, the selective
lifting of the resistance requirement in some statutes represents a tacit inclusion of
the requirement in similar statutes.
The absence of a provision eliminating resistance from sexual battery and sexual
imposition is problematic for all the reasons that the resistance requirement was
finally abolished in most American jurisdictions—namely because it represents an
unwarranted obstacle in a case for convicting an otherwise guilty defendant. The
possibility that resistance should be eliminated when it comes to some, but not all,
sexual offenses does not make sense. For instance, returning to Economo—the
sexual imposition case—the victim might have been paralyzed with fear when she
was inappropriately touched and fondled by her doctor.114 It seems unfair for the law
to require a victim under these circumstances to demonstrate physical resistance. Her
attacker, a doctor, is unprivileged in touching her in a sexual way. What relevance
would her resistance have in that context? Similarly, the prosecution should not have
to prove that the victim in a sexual battery prosecution of her mental health
professional physically resisted her attacker.115 Both the sexual battery and the sexual
imposition statutes cover circumstances in which the victim is substantially
incapacitated116 or unaware of the sexual conduct.117 How could physical resistance
112
See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1178 (2013); see also Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.1991) (“Under accepted
canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each
word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other
provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.”); Russell Holder, Say
What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Resurrection of Plain Meaning in California
Courts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 569 (1997) (“The textualists place great emphasis on the use of
canons of statutory construction as part of the careful reading of a statute, armed with logic
and a good dictionary. A good example of a textual canon is the maxim inclusio unis est
exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of the rest). Justice Scalia
used this maxim in Chan v. Korean Airlines to evaluate a statutory provision lacking an
express negation of limits on liability for failure to notify. Because other sections of the statute
provided such a remedy, he reasoned, Congress intended to deny a remedy in this instance.”
(footnotes omitted)).
113

“[I]t is well settled that to determine the intent of the General Assembly ‘it is the duty of
this court to give effect to the words used [in a statute], not to delete words used or to insert
words not used.’” State v. Dirmyer, No. 13-13-24, 2014 WL 858794, at ¶ 26 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 2014).
114

State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).

115

“The offender is a mental health professional, the other person is a mental health client
or patient of the offender, and the offender induces the other person to submit by falsely
representing to the other person that the sexual conduct is necessary for mental health
treatment purposes.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(10) (West 2006). A similar
provision appears in the sexual imposition statute. Id. § 2907.06(A)(5).
116

Id. §§ 2907.03(A)(2), 2907.06(A)(2).
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be expected under these circumstances? To the contrary, it is precisely this type of
case that underscores the fact that physical resistance by the victim is not required.118
2. Suggested Statutory Reform
The Ohio legislature should explicitly eliminate the resistance requirement from
all the primary sexual offenses, specifically the crimes of sexual battery and sexual
imposition. The same provision that appears in the rape and gross sexual imposition
statutes (but slightly amended as discussed in the previous section) should also be
included in the remaining two provisions: “The government need not prove that the
victim physically resisted the offender in prosecutions under this section.”119 The
addition of this explicit statutory elimination of the resistance requirement in the
sexual battery and sexual imposition statutes will extinguish any ambiguity about
whether resistance is still required for these two offenses. In this way, the legislature
will foreclose any statutory construction arguments by criminal defendants that a
resistance requirement still survives in Ohio’s major sexual offense provisions.
Moreover, these changes will harmonize all of Ohio’s sexual offense provisions, and
bring Ohio in line with the national trend to abolish physical resistance.
C. Resistance Language Appearing in the Incapacitation, Anti-Drugging, and
Coercion Provisions of the Rape, Gross Sexual Imposition, and Sexual Battery
Statutes
Although Ohio’s rape and gross sexual imposition statutes have explicitly
eliminated the resistance requirement, these same criminal statutes contain other
substantive provisions utilizing resistance language without embodying a resistance
requirement per se.120 For instance, one provision in Ohio’s rape statute concerning
sexual conduct with an impaired person reads:
The other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired
because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age,121
and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other

117

Id. §§ 2907.03(A)(3), 2907.06(A)(3).

118

Even the husband impersonation statute in the sexual battery provision would seem to
make resistance irrelevant. Id. § 2907.03(A)(4).
119

Id. § 2907.02(C) (language modified).

120

John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “NonConsent” Reform Movement in American Rae and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1081 (2011) (noting that 16 states do not require resistance but have provisions
with resistance language like “ unable to resist” or “prevented from resisting”).
121
The reference to advanced age as a circumstance meriting special treatment of the
victim is relatively unique among American jurisdictions. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 22.021 (2004) (aggravated sexual assault statute referring to elderly person); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-14 (LexisNexis 2004) (aggravated criminal sexual assault statute providing
the victim was 60 years or over when the offense was committed). This appears to be a
salutary aspect of Ohio’s statute because of the growing number of persons in the American
population of advanced age and the likeliness of those persons being subject to sexual assault
of various kinds.
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person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a
mental or physical condition or because of advanced age.122
A second section of the rape statute, outlawing the administration of a drug or
intoxicant as a prelude to sexual conduct, states: “For the purpose of preventing
resistance, the offender substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or control
by administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person
surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception.”123 The gross sexual
imposition statute contains two parallel provisions with the same resistance
language.124
Finally, language relating to resistance appears in a third Ohio offense—sexual
battery. This statute, which does not contain language eliminating the need for the
victim to physically resist her attacker,125 contains the following alternative: “The
offender knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means that would
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.”126
Thus, although Ohio’s rape and gross sexual imposition statutes eliminate the
need for physical resistance, resistance appears to be an important explicit
consideration in these two sexual offenses—and also the sexual battery statute—as a
means of measuring the degree of overpowering the defendant employed against his
victim. The question becomes whether these statutory references to resistance in the
substantive sexual assault provisions are inconsistent with the provisions eliminating
the need of the government to prove physical resistance by the victim.
1. Critique of Using Resistance Language to Describe Impairment of Victim’s
Ability to Consent
The existence of resistance language in modern sexual offense provisions dealing
with substantial incapacitation due to mental or physical condition or to the
administration of intoxicants is quite confusing when other provisions of these same
statutes provide that resistance is not required by the victim. Ohio’s facially
inconsistent approach to the resistance requirement is not unique. Courts in several
other jurisdictions have confronted internal inconsistencies in their sexual offense
provisions of the same nature as those currently confronting Ohio.
In People v. Giardino,127 for example, a California case involving the resistance
requirement in a drugging case, the jury requested further guidance on the meaning
122

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(c) (West 2006) (rape) (emphasis added); Id.
§ 2907.05(A)(5) (gross sexual imposition with slightly different language not relevant here).
123

Id. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (rape) (emphasis added); Id. § 2907.05(A)(2) (gross sexual
imposition with slight variation in language not relevant to this discussion).
124
Id. § 2907.05(A)(2) (“For the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender
substantially impairs the judgment or control of the other person . . . by administering any
drug, . . .”); Id. § 2907.05(A)(5) (“The ability of the other person to resist or consent . . . is
substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced
age . . . and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the ability to resist or
consent . . . is substantially impaired . . . .”).
125

See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.

126

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

127

People v. Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 2000); see also People v. Salazar,
193 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1983); People v. Leon, 2012 WL 3570395 (Cal. Ct. App.) (“On the
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of resistance in California’s rape statute.128 The appellate court noted that normally
jury instructions that track the statutory language are sufficient unless the jury would
have difficulty applying them, but the court determined that an additional instruction
was required in Giardino because the meaning of the phrase “preventing resistance”
was not clear.129 In explaining that resistance did not refer to physical resistance, but
rather the victim’s ability to exercise judgment, the court held that the jury should
have been instructed that “as a result of her level of intoxication, the victim lacked
the legal capacity to give ‘consent’ as that term is defined in § 261.6.”130 The
appellate court added: “We are sympathetic to the quandary in which the trial court
was placed. Its reluctance to vary from the statutory language or the standard jury
instructions is understandable, particularly in light of the absence of any prior case
law directly interpreting the phrase at issue.”131 One could argue the California
appellate court rewrote the rape statute, changing the issue from resistance to consent
in an effort to clarify and modernize California law.
Similarly, in Elliott v. State,132 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had to
decipher the meaning of “physically unable to resist” in the state’s sexual assault
statute.133 Reviewing the history of the resistance requirement in Texas rape law, the
court concluded that “the notion that the amount of compulsion necessary to
constitute sexual assault should be measured by the degree of resistance to be
expected under the circumstances was dropped from the statutory scheme.”134 Like
Giardino, the Elliot court interpreted the relevant resistance provision in terms of
consent, holding “that where assent in fact has not been given, and the actor knows
that the victim’s physical impairment is such that resistance is not reasonably to be
expected, sexual intercourse is ‘without consent’ under the sexual assault statute.”135
Thus, the Texas court found that resistance language misdirects the inquiry of

merits, we disagree with defendant's criticism of Giardino. There have been no cases
criticizing or contravening Giardino in the 12 years that have passed since Giardino was
decided. To the contrary, the Court of Appeal has recently cited this specific language in
Giardino with approval. See People v. Smith, 191 Cal. App. 4th 199, 204-05 (2010).”).
128

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3) (West 2001).

129

See Giardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324.

130
Id. California law defines consent as “positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to
the exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of
the nature of the act or transaction involved.” CAL PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2014).
131

Id. at 325.

132

Elliot v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Anderson v. State, No.
02–10–00489–CR, 2012 WL 1222148, at *1 (Tex. App. Apr. 12, 2012) (“When assent in fact
has not been given, and the actor knows that the victim's physical impairment is such that
resistance is not reasonably to be expected, sexual intercourse is “without consent” under the
sexual assault statute.”).
133

Elliot, 858 S.W.2d at 485.

134

Id.

135

Id.; see also Horowitz v. State, No. 01-93-01022-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 1080, at
*22-23 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 1996) (affirming the standard).
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interest: The question is not whether a victim resisted but whether she or he
consented.136
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, the court struggled with the tension
between one provision in the rape statute stating resistance was not required and
another provision outlawing the use of a “threat of forcible compulsion that would
prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.”137 This language is quite
similar to Ohio’s sexual battery provision. The court wrote: “Although the ‘no
resistance requirement’ does not, on its face, in any way restrict the situations to
which it may apply, it appears that the statute must have limits.”138 Then, the court
commented that if the “no resistance requirement” applied to the threat section of the
rape statute, “the description of the type of threat which is sufficient would be
rendered wholly meaningless.”139 The court reconciled the two provisions as follows:
To be consistent, therefore, the “no resistance requirement” must be
applied only to prevent any adverse inference to be drawn against the
person who, while being “forcibly compelled” to engage in intercourse,
chooses not to physically resist. Since there is no evidence that the instant
victim was at any time “forcibly compelled” to engage in sexual
intercourse, our conclusion is not at odds with the “no resistance
requirement.”140
As I have argued elsewhere,141 the use of resistance language in provisions
concerning the use of drugs to disable victims or in terms of describing a victim’s
incapacitation is confusing to juries and deflects attention from the real question in
these cases: Was the victim capable of giving meaningful consent to the sexual act
on the occasion in question?142 Thus, it would be preferable to include explicit
statutory language clarifying that the inquiry is really not about resistance but about
the victim’s ability to give meaningful consent to the sexual conduct or contact.143 A
legislative enactment is superior to a judicial interpretation as in the previous cases,

136

Elliot, 858 S.W.2d at 485. As one dissenting judge wrote in the famous case of Rusk v.
State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev’d 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981): “Thus it is
that the focus is almost entirely on the extent of resistance—the victim’s acts, rather than
those of her assailant. Attention is directed not to the wrongful stimulus, but to the victim’s
reactions to it.” Id. at 629 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
137

Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, at 1348 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).

138

Id.; cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added) (“The
offender knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.”).
139

Berkovitz, 609 A.2d at 1348 n.7.

140

Id.

141

See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for
Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131 (2002).
142

Id. at 200.

143

Id.
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because criminal defendants can continue to challenge those judicial
pronouncements,144 and a legislative enactment preserves the principle of legality.145
2. Suggested Statutory Reform
The operative language of the rape and gross sexual imposition statutes should
focus directly on consent because, after all, sexual offenses protect victims from
unwanted, nonconsensual sexual activity. Turning first to the mental or physical
incapacitation provisions in the rape and gross sexual imposition statutes, the
resistance language is provided as an alternative to consent.146 Thus, these statutory
sections should be amended by deleting the phrase “resist and” and adding the
phrase “to the sexual conduct[contact]” for greater overall clarity. The statute would
then read:
The ability of the other person to consent to the sexual conduct[contact]
or the ability of one of the other persons to consent to the sexual
conduct[contact] is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical
condition or because of advanced age, and the offender knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the ability to consent to the sexual
conduct[contact] of the other person or of one of the other persons is
substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition or
because of advanced age.
This amendment would more forthrightly emphasize the importance of consent
in the context of rape and gross sexual imposition and help to clarify the relevant
inquiry.
With respect to the general anti-drugging provisions of the rape and gross sexual
imposition statutes, the legislature used only resistance language and did not provide
an alternative based on consent.147 However, these statutes should also focus directly
on consent because of that requirement’s importance in all sexual offenses. It should
read:
For the purpose of preventing the exercise of reasoned/meaningful
consent, the offender substantially impairs the other person’s judgment or
control by administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to
the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception.

144

See, e.g., People v. Leon, No. B230034, 2012 WL 3570395 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 20,
2012).
145
See, e.g., Paul Robinson describes the “principle of legality” as the proposition that
“criminal liability and punishment can be based only upon a prior legislative enactment of a
prohibition that is expressed with adequate precision and clarity.” Paul H. Robinson, Fair
Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 336 (2005).
146
“The other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired . . . .” OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(c) (West 2006) (rape) (emphasis added); Id. § 2907.05(A)(5)
(gross sexual imposition with slightly different language not relevant here).
147
“For the purpose of preventing resistance . . . .” Id. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (rape) (emphasis
added); Id. § 2907.05(A)(2) (gross sexual imposition with slight variation in language not
relevant to this discussion).
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This amendment to the general anti-drugging provisions will clearly
communicate that it is the drug’s effect on the victim’s ability to consent that is
important, not the victim’s ability to physically resist—something that the Ohio
legislature has deemed to be legally irrelevant.
Similarly, the language of the sexual battery statute should be amended to delete
the reference to resistance and reframe the critical question in terms of consent.148
The provision might read as follows: “The offender knowingly coerces the other
person to submit by any means that would prevent the exercise of
reasoned/meaningful consent by a person of ordinary resolution.” In these three
different provisions, the statutes’ descriptions of victim incapacitation, intoxication,
or coercion should be written in terms of the inability of the victim to give informed
or knowing consent to the sexual act rather than her inability to resist.
One final problem must be addressed. Under Ohio law, no definition of
“consent” or “lack of consent” appears in the general definitional section for
criminal offenses (i.e., a global consent provision)149 or in the specific definitional
section for sexual offenses.150 In contrast, Ohio’s criminal fraud and theft chapter
contains a provision entitled “Evidence of victim’s lack of capacity to give consent,”
which reads:
In a prosecution for any alleged violation of a provision of this chapter, if
the lack of consent of the victim is an element . . . , evidence that, at the
time . . . , the victim lacked the capacity to give consent is admissible to
show that the victim did not give consent.
As used in this section, “lacks the capacity to consent” means being
impaired for any reason to the extent that the person lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make and carry out reasonable decisions
concerning the person or the person’s resources.151
Thus, Ohio law provides more guidance on the meaning of consent (or a lack
thereof) when it comes to property crimes like theft and fraud than in the context of
the sexual offenses. The omission of a definition of consent for sexual offenses
should be remedied because of the importance of consent to rape law in general, and
the references to consent in various provisions of the rape and gross sexual
imposition statutes.
This omission could be remedied in one of two ways. First, some jurisdictions
define consent for purposes of all of their criminal statutes, often employing
language based on Model Penal Code 2.11, which provides:
[A]ssent does not constitute consent if: . . . (b) it is given by a person who
by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly
148

Minnesota defines mentally incapacitated as, inter alia, “lacks the judgment to give a
reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration.” MINN. STAT. § 609.341(7) (2009)
(in definition of mentally incapacitated).
149

See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 114
(1998) (discussing global consent provisions).
150

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (West 2014).

151

Id. § 2913.73.
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unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment
as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the
offense . . . .152
Second, other jurisdictions define consent in terms of their sexual offense
provisions. For example, California’s statute reads: “‘consent’ shall be defined to
mean positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The
person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or
transaction involved.”153 Minnesota’s tripartite formulation—withhold consent,
withdraw it, or communicate nonconsent— is helpful because it emphasizes that
consent is a continuing activity, not a one-time event.154 The use of descriptive words
such as reasoned, meaningful, informed, or knowing in characterizing the nature of
the consent required in sexual assault cases is advisable to increase clarity and to
provide more guidance to the prosecution, the defense, and the jury.
V. CONCLUSION
“[R]ape is a most detestable crime, . . . ; but it must be remembered, that it
is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.”155
The marital rape exemption and the historical requirements in rape law of
resistance, corroboration, and chastity continue to infect both statutory law and the
way that actors with the criminal justice system—police, prosecutors, judges, and
juries—see the crime of rape. Reforming each of these areas with an eye toward
diminishing the legal impact of negative social attitudes toward [] rape victims is the
next step in rape law reform.156
Vestiges of a by-gone era in which the victims of rape were subjected to special
procedural and evidentiary obstacles—like the corroboration and resistance
152

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(b) (1962).

153

CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2014).

154

MINN. STAT. § 609.341(9) (2010) (“‘Physically helpless’ means that a person is (a)
asleep or not conscious, (b) unable to withhold consent or to withdraw consent because of a
physical condition, or (c) unable to communicate nonconsent and the condition is known or
reasonably should have been known to the actor.” (emphasis added)).
155

HALE, supra note 2, at 635. In his treatise, Hale follows this statement with two
instances in which the victims of “rape” were found to have lied. Then, he comments:
I only mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious upon trials of
offenses of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease be imposed
upon without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense many times
transporting the judge and jury with so much indignation, that they are over-hastily
carried to conviction of the person accused thereof by the confident testimony,
sometimes of malicious and false witnesses.
Id. at 636. According to Anderson, these cautionary instructions are on the wane. Anderson,
The Legacy, supra note 47. Fred Strebeigh reported that the California Supreme Court
discovered the “long-neglected context” for Hale’s instruction, namely that it pertained to
cases involving girls under twelve years old and not those involving adult women. FRED
STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 327 (2009).
156

Anderson, Diminishing, supra note 14, at 645.
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requirements—persist in modern statutory enactments despite the universal rejection
of their rationale—“because ladies lie.” In fact, no empirical evidence exists that
victims of rape are more likely to lie about their attacks than are any other victims of
crime. Yet, rape reform will not be complete until these vestiges have been removed
from jurisdictions’ sexual offense provisions. Removing them has practical and
symbolic implications for the successful prosecution of sexual offenses.
The amendments proposed by this Article are modest in scope.157 First, Ohio
legislators should amend the sexual imposition and gross sexual imposition statutes
to delete references to corroboration, completing the process started many years ago.
Second, legislators should alter the wording of the provisions eliminating resistance
in the rape and gross sexual imposition statutes to emphasize it is the government,
not the victim, who bears no burden in proving resistance in a criminal case. Third,
the resistance-elimination provision, in modified form, should be added to both the
sexual battery and sexual imposition statutes to establish that physical resistance is
also not required for these sexual offenses. Fourth, the substantial incapacitation and
anti-drugging provisions in the rape and gross sexual impositions statutes, as well as
the coercion provision in the sexual battery statute, should be reworded to emphasize
lack of consent rather than resistance. Finally, the Ohio legislature should provide a
definition of consent for use in applying the sexual offense provisions. These
changes will add clarity to Ohio’s sexual offense provisions and modernize them by
bringing them into the twenty first century, finally eliminating the vestiges of a basic
distrust of sexual assault victims.

157

I leave for another day a more fundamental overhauling of Ohio’s sexual offense
provisions.
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APPENDIX: EXCERPTS FROM OHIO’S CURRENT SEXUAL OFFENSE PROVISIONS
A. The Corroboration Requirement in the Sexual Imposition Statute
No person shall be convicted of a violation of this section solely upon the
victim’s testimony unsupported by other evidence.158
B. Corroboration as a Grading Criterion in the Gross Sexual Imposition Statute
Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B)
of this section is a felony of the third degree. Except as otherwise
provided in this division, for gross sexual imposition committed in
violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section there is a presumption
that a prison term shall be imposed for the offense. The court shall impose
on an offender convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of
division (A)(4) or (B) of this section a mandatory prison term equal to one
of the prison terms prescribed in § 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a
felony of the third degree if either of the following applies:
(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in
the case corroborating the violation;
(b) The offender previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
violation of this section, rape, the former offense of felonious sexual
penetration, or sexual battery, and the victim of the previous offense
was less than thirteen years of age.159
C. Language of the Resistance-Elimination Provisions in the Rape and Gross Sexual
Imposition Statutes
A victim need not prove physical resistance to the offender in
prosecutions under this section.160
D. Provisions Using Resistance Language in the Rape, Sexual Battery, and Gross
Sexual Imposition Statutes
For the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially
impairs the other person’s judgment or control by administering any drug,
intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person surreptitiously or
by force, threat of force, or deception.
....
The other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired
because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age, and
the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other
158

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(B)(2) (West 2006).

159

Id. § 2907.05(B)(2).

160

Id. §§ 2907.02(C) (rape), 2907.05(D) (gross sexual imposition).
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person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a
mental or physical condition or because of advanced age.161
The offender knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means
that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.162
For the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially
impairs the judgment or control of the other person or of one of the other
persons by administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to
the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception.
....
The ability of the other person to resist or consent or the ability of one of
the other persons to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of
a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age, and the
offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the ability to resist
or consent of the other person or of one of the other persons is
substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition or
because of advanced age.163

161

Id. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), (c) (rape).

162

Id. § 2907.03(A)(1) (sexual battery).

163

Id. §§2907.05(A)(2), (5) (gross sexual imposition).
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